Machines will attain human levels of intelligence by the year 2040, predicts robotics expert Hans Moravec. And by 2050, they will have far surpassed us. In this mind-bending new book, Hans Moravec takes the reader on a roller coaster ride packed with such startling predictions. He tells us, for instance, that in the not-too-distant future, an army of robots will displace workers, causing massive, unprecedented unemployment. But then, says Moravec, a period of very comfortable existence will follow, as (...) humans benefit from a fully automated economy. And eventually, as machines evolve far beyond humanity, robots will supplant us. But if Moravec predicts the end of the domination by human beings, his is not a bleak vision. Far from railing against a future in which machines rule the world, Moravec embraces it, taking the startling view that intelligent robots will actually be our evolutionary heirs. "Intelligent machines, which will grow from us, learn our skills, and share our goals and values, can be viewed as children of our minds." And since they are our children, we will want them to outdistance us. In fact, in a bid for immortality, many of our descendants will choose to transform into "ex humans," as they upload themselves into advanced computers. We will become our children and live forever. In his provocative new book, the highly anticipated follow-up to his bestselling volume Mind Children, Moravec charts the trajectory of robotics in breathtaking detail. A must read for artificial intelligence, technology, and computer enthusiasts, Moravec's freewheeling but informed speculations present a future far different than we ever dared imagine. (shrink)

In ‘belief revision’ a theory\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}$$\end{document} is revised with a formula φ resulting in a revised theory \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}\ast\varphi$$\end{document}. Typically, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\neg\varphi$$\end{document} is in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}$$\end{document}, one has to give up belief in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\neg\varphi$$\end{document} by a process (...) of retraction, and φ is in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}\ast\varphi$$\end{document}. We propose to model belief revision in a dynamic epistemic logic. In this setting, we typically have an information state (pointed Kripke model) for the theory \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}$$\end{document} wherein the agent believes the negation of the revision formula, i.e., wherein \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$B\neg\varphi$$\end{document} is true. The revision with φ is a program *φ that transforms this information state into a new information state. The transformation is described by a dynamic modal operator [*φ], that is interpreted as a binary relation [ [*φ] ] between information states. The next information state is computed from the current information state and the belief revision formula. If the revision is successful, the agent believes φ in the resulting state, i.e., Bφ is then true. To make this work, as information states we propose ‘doxastic epistemic models’ that represent both knowledge and degrees of belief. These are multi-modal and multi-agent Kripke models. They are constructed from preference relations for agents, and they satisfy various characterizable multi-agent frame properties. Iterated, revocable, and higher-order belief revision are all quite natural in this setting. We present, for an example, five different ways of such dynamic belief revision. One can also see that as a non-deterministic epistemic action with two alternatives, where one is preferred over the other, and there is a natural generalization to general epistemic actions with preferences. (shrink)

Controversies, i.e., multiple theory confrontations, may have a strong impact on the development of science. By an analysis of the so-called resonance controversy in chemistry the view that controversies and their resolution differ considerably from the process of theory succession is defended. It is argued that controversies are symptomatic of foundational problems, produce theory-scattering or domain-splitting, and induce ontological shifts. An explication is given of the role of existence claims and the applicability of Ockham's Razor in the resolution of controversies. (...) The requirement of a realistic interpretation of theories at all times, as defended by some philosophers, is criticised. (shrink)

Seit dem Beginn meines philosophischen Forschens vor vielen Jahren begleitet mich die Problematik von Vierfachstrukturen in den Philosophien der Menschheit. Während meine Aufmerksamkeit zunächst vor allem auf viergliedrige Aussagemuster gerichtet war - der schriftliche Niederschlag davon liegt als dickes Buch vor –, sah ich es, angeregt und bestätigt durch Funde von Materialien in Quellentexten, zunehmend als erforderlich an, die genannten Urteils- und Prädikationsformen bzw. -formeln im mir zunächst unerklärlichen Zusammenhang mit vier Elementen, und wie ich heute weiß, den vier Elementen (...) des sich selbst reflektierenden und auslegenden Verstandes zu bedenken. Ich habe mein geistiges Ringen um den Fragekomplex, der daraus erwächst, unter das Leitwort »Tetralogos« gestellt, wobei sich der Schwerpunkt allmählich hin zur Geistmetaphysik, einer in der modernen Gelehrtenwelt allgemein als veraltet angesehenen Disziplin, verschob. Die Antworten, die daraus erwachsen, sollen irgendwann in einem weiteren der bis zum zweiten Band realisierten Tetralogie meiner Hauptwerke zusammengefaßt werden. (shrink)

Seit dem Beginn meines philosophischen Forschens vor vielen Jahren begleitet mich die Problematik von Vierfachstrukturen in den Philosophien der Menschheit. Während meine Aufmerksamkeit zunächst vor allem auf viergliedrige Aussagemuster gerichtet war - der schriftliche Niederschlag davon liegt als dickes Buch vor –, sah ich es, angeregt und bestätigt durch Funde von Materialien in Quellentexten, zunehmend als erforderlich an, die genannten Urteils- und Prädikationsformen bzw. -formeln im mir zunächst unerklärlichen Zusammenhang mit vier Elementen, und wie ich heute weiß, den vier Elementen (...) des sich selbst reflektierenden und auslegenden Verstandes zu bedenken. Ich habe mein geistiges Ringen um den Fragekomplex, der daraus erwächst, unter das Leitwort »Tetralogos« gestellt, wobei sich der Schwerpunkt allmählich hin zur Geistmetaphysik, einer in der modernen Gelehrtenwelt allgemein als veraltet angesehenen Disziplin, verschob. Die Antworten, die daraus erwachsen, sollen irgendwann in einem weiteren der bis zum zweiten Band realisierten Tetralogie meiner Hauptwerke zusammengefaßt werden. (shrink)

This paper describes some components of a working system which drives a vehicle through cluttered real world environments under computer control, guided by images perceived through an onboard television camera. The emphasis is on reliable and fast low level visual techniques which determine the existence and location of objects in the world, but do not identify them. They include an interest operator for choosing distinctive regions in images, a correlator for finding matching regions in similar images, a geometric camera solver (...) which determines camera displacement and distance to objects from motion stereo information and an automatic distortion corrector which compensates for camera imperfections. (shrink)

A brief review of Carnap's formal program in philosophy of science.

In ‘belief revision’ a theory is revised with a formula φ resulting in a revised theory . Typically, is in , one has to give up belief in by a process of retraction, and φ is in . We propose to model belief revision in a dynamic epistemic logic. In this setting, we typically have an information state (pointed Kripke model) for the theory wherein the agent believes the negation of the revision formula, i.e., wherein is true. The revision with (...) φ is a program *φ that transforms this information state into a new information state. The transformation is described by a dynamic modal operator [*φ], that is interpreted as a binary relation [ [*φ] ] between information states. The next information state is computed from the current information state and the belief revision formula. If the revision is successful, the agent believes φ in the resulting state, i.e., Bφ is then true. To make this work, as information states we propose ‘doxastic epistemic models’ that represent both knowledge and degrees of belief. These are multi-modal and multi-agent Kripke models. They are constructed from preference relations for agents, and they satisfy various characterizable multi-agent frame properties. Iterated, revocable, and higher-order belief revision are all quite natural in this setting. We present, for an example, five different ways of such dynamic belief revision. One can also see that as a non-deterministic epistemic action with two alternatives, where one is preferred over the other, and there is a natural generalization to general epistemic actions with preferences. (shrink)

To describe simultaneous knowledge updates for different subgroups we propose anepistemic language with dynamic operators for actions. The language is interpreted onequivalence states (S5 states). The actions are interpreted as state transformers. Two crucial action constructors are learning and local choice. Learning isthe dynamic equivalent of common knowledge. Local choice aids in constraining theinterpretation of an action to a functional interpretation (state transformer).Bisimilarity is preserved under execution of actions. The language is applied todescribe various actions in card games.

Pit is a multi-player card game that simulates the commodities trading market, and where actions consist of bidding and of swapping cards. We present a formal description of the knowledge and change of knowledge in that game. The description is in a standard language for dynamic epistemics expanded with assignment. Assignment is necessary to describe that cards change hands. The formal description is a prerequisite to model Pit in game theory. The main contribution of this paper should be seen as (...) the rigorous formalization of all knowledge in Pit. (shrink)

Take your average publication on the dynamics of knowledge. In one of its first paragraphs you will probably encounter a phrase like “a logic of public announcements was first proposed by Plaza in 1989 (Plaza 1989).” Tracking down this publication seems easy, because googling its title ‘Logics of Public Communications’ takes you straight to Jan Plaza’s website where it is online available in the author’s own version, including, on that page, very helpful and full bibliographic references to the proceedings in (...) which it originally appeared. Those proceedings are then somewhat harder to find. In fact, I have never seen them. Unfortunately, for the research community, Plaza’s work has never been followed up by a journal version. I am very grateful to the editor Wiebe van der Hoek of the journal ‘Knowledge, Rationality, and Action’ to correct this omission.Plaza’s work is reprinted as such, without an update encompassing more than fifteen additional years of research in this area. This commentary aims to provide some background to bridge that gap. (shrink)

In unconditionally secure protocols, a sender and receiver are able to communicate their secrets to each other without the eavesdropper(s) being able to learn the secret, even when the eavesdropper intercepts the entire communication. We investigate such protocols for the special case of deals of cards over players, where two players aim to communicate to each other their hand of cards without the remaining player(s) learning a single card from either hand. In this contribution we show that a particular protocol (...) of length strictly larger than two (i.e., consisting of more than just one announcement by one player, and one other announcement by the other player) is after all not acceptable, and therefore does not constitute a new solution. The demonstration requires a detailed case-based analysis. The result may bring a general approach to arbitrary finite-length protocols closer. (shrink)

While discussions of the ethics of the placebo have usually dealt with their use in a research context, the authors address here the question of the placebo in clinical practice. It is argued, firstly, that the placebo can be an effective treatment. Secondly, it is demonstrated that its use does not always entail deception. Finally guidelines are presented according to which the placebo may be used for clinical purposes. It is suggested that in select cases, use of the placebo may (...) even be morally imperative. The argument is illustrated by three case vignettes. (shrink)

In the present study, we examine the process through which abusive supervision impacts employee creativity. Specifically, we test whether abusive supervision is associated with lower levels of employee creativity and if this effect is mediated by employee sleep deprivation and emotional exhaustion. Results showed that abusive supervision had an indirect negative relationship with employee creativity via its impact on employee sleep deprivation and emotional exhaustion. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the negative effects of abusive supervision on employee (...) creativity and the processes by which they occur. (shrink)

The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann`s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology - purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones - connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann`s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology - purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones - connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

Nash is famous for many inventions, but it is less known that he, simultaneously with Marschak, also was the first to axiomatize expected utility for risk. In particular, these authors were the first to state the independence condition, a condition that should have been but was not stated by von Neumann and Morgenstern. Marschak’s paper resulted from interactions with several people at the Cowles Commission. We document unique letters and personal communications with Nash, Samuelson, Arrow, Dalkey, and others, making plausible (...) that Nash made his discovery independently from the others. (shrink)

Summary The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann’s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology – purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones – connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

Summary In 1919 Nicolai Hartmann convincingly justified that there cannot exist a “general law of causation” as A. Meinong had in mind. For him Meinong’s understanding of causation was bound on the region of the physical layer of being, simultaneously postulating it as the only possible causation there. This is the starting point of the comparison between N. Hartmann‘s understanding of causation and that of the Gestalt Theory, for which neither in psychic nor in natural context linear-successive causality plays a (...) part. Therefore NH’s conception of 1919 was still completely incompatible with that of the Gestalt Theory despite the fact that he was distancing himself from the “general law of causation” sensu Meinong. 20 years later he changed this by adding the “Wechselwirkung” to the linear successive causation in the physical layer. In doing so he approached the Gestalt theoretical position but failed it insofar as for it his linear-successive understanding of causation generally has had its day with regard to natural processes, also consequently for the physical. Thus the term “causation“ had become free for a dynamic concept of causation which is equally appropriate for the physical and the psychic. NH makes this move not until 1949, shortly before his death, by writing:.... It is the opinion of the author of this work that the ingenious systematics of NH‘s Critical Ontology should make it possible to execute the necessary corrections in some details of his theory of layers without questioning the structure of his systematics, thus carrying out what NH was not able to do himself due to his death. (shrink)